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Abstract—Construction and engineering projects are typically
complex in nature and are prone to cost and schedule overruns.
A significant factor that often contributes to these overruns is re-
work. Omissions errors, in particular, have been found to account
for as much as 38% of the total rework costs experienced. To date,
there has been limited research that has sought to determine the
underlying factors that contribute to omission errors in construc-
tion and engineering projects. Using data derived from 59 in-depth
interviews undertaken with various project participants, a generic
systemic causal model of the key factors that contributed to omis-
sion errors is presented. The developed causal model can improve
understanding of the archetypal nature and underlying dynam-
ics of omission errors. Error management strategies that can be
considered for implementation in projects are also discussed.
Index Terms—Error, error management, omission, pathogens,
rework.
I. INTRODUCTION
IN THE construction and resource engineering sector in Aus-tralia, particularly in Western Australia, a wide range of
project types have commenced to meet the increasing demand
for new infrastructure and resources, such as oil and gas, baux-
ite, copper, iron ore, and nickel. Such projects are typically
complex and often prone to cost and schedule overruns [11].
A significant factor that often contributes to these overruns is
rework [66]. While several definitions of rework are available
within the literature, (e.g., [6], [23], [25], [69]), a common theme
arising is that which relates to “the unnecessary of effort of re-
doing a process or activity that was incorrectly implemented the
first time” [51].”
Design changes, errors, and omissions account for 79% of
the total rework costs experienced in a project [13], but of this
percentage, omissions errors alone account for 38% [77]. Omis-
sions errors can be defined as failures to follow due procedure
when undertaking a task(s). These are the single most com-
mon form of human error [65, p. 41]. Specifically, projects
appear to progress smoothly until nearing completion, when
such errors made earlier are discovered, necessitating costly
rework [25], [30]. Such rework transpires as overtime, addi-
tional hiring of resources (including labor and plant), schedule
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slippage, and reductions in project scope or quality [25]. The ad-
verse consequences of these difficulties include reduced profit,
loss of market share and reputation, increased turnover of man-
agement and workforce, lower productivity, higher costs, and,
all too frequently, costly litigation between participants over
responsibility for overruns and delays [1], [24], [30].
Omission errors are a result of pathogens within a system
that translate into error provoking conditions within the firm
and project (e.g., time pressure, understaffing, fatigue, and
inexperience). These pathogens contribute to unworkable
relationships and procedures as well design and construction
deficiencies [64]. There has been a considerable amount of
research that has examined the nature of human errors, its types,
and causes in a range of areas such as aviation (e.g., [10], [38]),
medicine (e.g., [62]), engineering design (e.g., [15]), and
construction (e.g., [7], [8]), yet studies that explore the under-
lying conditions and factors that contribute to the occurrence
of omission errors are limited. Using data derived from 59
in-depth interviews undertaken with various participants
operating in the construction and resource engineering sector, a
generic causal model of omission errors is developed. From the
findings presented, error management strategies for reducing
the incidence of omission errors are then discussed.
II. PROJECT PATHOGENS
Pathogens are latent conditions [61] and lay dormant within
a system until an error comes to light. Before they are appar-
ent, project participants often remain unaware of the impact
upon project performance that particular decisions, practices,
or procedures can have [18]. Pathogens can arise because of
strategic decisions taken by top management or key decision-
makers. Such decisions may be mistaken but they need not be.
Latent conditions can lay dormant within a system for a con-
siderable period of time and thus become an integral part of
everyday work practices. However, once they combine with ac-
tive failures (which are similar to Deming’s common causes),
then omission errors can arise and the consequences of which
may be significant. Active failures are essentially unsafe acts
committed by people who are in direct contact with a system.
Such acts include: slips, lapses, mistakes, and procedural vio-
lations [64]. Active failures are often difficult to foresee, and
therefore, cannot be eliminated by simply reacting to the event
that has occurred. Latent conditions, however, can be identified
and remedied before an adverse event occurs.
Pathogens have been defined by a number of qualities [18,
p. 428].
1) They are a relatively stable phenomena that have been in
existence for a substantial time before the error occurs.
0018-9391/$25.00 © 2009 IEEE
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2) Before the error occurs, they would not have been seen as
obvious stages in an identifiable sequence failure.
3) They are strongly connected to the error, and are identifi-
able as principal causes of the error once it occurs.
The pathogens that have been revealed to contribute to the
occurrence of errors can be categorized as follows [18].
1) Practice—arising from people’s deliberate practices.
2) Task—arising from the nature of the task being performed.
3) Circumstance—arising from the situation or environment
the project was operating in.
4) Organization—arising from organizational structure or
operation.
5) System—arising from an organizational system.
6) Industry—arising from the structural property of the in-
dustry.
7) Tool—arising from the technical characteristic of the tool.
Busby and Hughes [18] found that many pathogen-orientated
errors in engineering firms were based on practices (i.e., those
pathogens from people’s deliberate practices) that attempted
to solve a particular problem. For example, recycling design
details, specifications, and other contract documentation to re-
duce time and save money without giving due considerations
to the bespoke nature of construction projects. The practice
of starting work on the basis of tentative information is often
a consequence of working within the realm of nontraditional
procurement methods (overlapping of activities), and therefore,
short lead times are often needed to meet a project’s schedule.
Individuals may repeat practices, such as taking short cuts
and not following due processes. When a practice provides an
outcome that is deemed to be satisfactory by the individual, then
this practice is used on future projects even if it is unsuitable
for that project [18]; for example, the decision by designers
to eschew audits, checks, verifications, and reviews prior to
releasing documentation for pricing or construction. Despite
the importance of such activities, this practice has become a
norm due to the financial and time pressures being imposed
upon design firms by their clients. Tilley and McFallen [74]
have suggested that there is a positive correlation between the
demands imposed by clients for earlier completion of projects
and the likelihood that designers produce erroneous contract
documentation. Lack of attention to quality management during
the design process has resulted in the notion of rework becoming
entrenched in work practices, and consequently, less profit is
being experienced [32], [70]. Contractors and subcontractors
are also susceptible to omission errors, for example, quality,
safety, and environmental management system constraints may
not be strictly adhered to, and as a result, tasks or processes may
need to be reworked.
III. CAUSES OF ERROR
Errors occur due to physiological and psychological limi-
tations of humans [37]. It is a matter of contention whether
individuals can justifiably be blamed for all errors, as making
mistakes is an innate characteristic of human nature [61]. Hu-
man errors occur for various reasons, and therefore, different
actions are needed to prevent or avoid the different sorts of error
experienced in construction and resource engineering projects.
Regardless of the skill level, experience, or training that in-
dividuals possess, errors and omissions may be made at any
time [2], [8], [35], [49], [60], [75].
Reason [62] proffered that there is no one error taxonomy
that can be used for all circumstances as different error clas-
sifications serve different needs. Despite Reason’s [62] asser-
tion, several classification schemes, however, have been put
forward for identifying generic causes of error (e.g., [5], [43])
and are deemed useful for assessing potential risks in projects.
For example, Rogge et al. [69] developed a tool to provide
early warning of possible rework prior to construction, based
on the underlying conditions that could contribute to its occur-
rence. Such conditions include the degree of design coordination
that is undertaken, the extent of design schedule compression,
and the regularity of engineering verifications. Similarly, Man-
avazhi [56] developed a probabilistic model that could be used
to forecast the propensity of a project to encounter design revi-
sions. Design revisions are an inevitable and integral feature of
the design process; therefore, it is important that firms are able
to put mechanisms in place to plan and manage them as they
occur [55]. Design revisions that require rework arise due to
errors, incomplete misinformation, and changes (e.g., those that
are client initiated and unforeseen) and can have a detrimental
effect on productivity, morale, designer attitudes, and the overall
profitability of the design practice [55].
An error can arise due a number of reasons.
1) Mistake—an error occurs as a result of ignorance of
the correct task or the correct way to perform it. Rea-
son [62] suggests that such mistakes can be either rule-
or knowledge-based. With respect to rule-based errors, a
practitioner may simply misapply a rule that has worked
in a previous situation because they failed to notice con-
tradictions. Alternatively, a bad rule that has remained
uncorrected in a practitioner’s collection of problem solu-
tions could be applied to the situation at hand. Knowledge-
based mistakes occur when the practitioner encounters a
novel situation that lies outside the range of their learnt
problem solving routines. Kletz [48] refers to such mis-
takes as a mismatch, as they arise because they are beyond
the physical or mental capability of an individual. When
confronted with such a position, practitioners are often
forced to resort to slow and effortful reasoning and as
such susceptible to making errors [62]. This is because a
practitioner can only attend to and manipulate one or two
discrete items at a given time, and they have to reply on
a mental model of the current situation that is inherently
incomplete [61]. In addition, practitioners have a tendency
to follow their instinct and select features of the world to
support it, while neglecting contradictory evidence that
presents itself before them.
2) Noncompliance—an error occurs because an individual
decides not to carry out a task or not to carry it out
the way instructed or expected. They are deliberate acts
and may occur due to motivational problems (e.g., low
morale, poor supervision, perceived lack of concern, etc.).
Such errors occur in a regulated social context and the
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TABLE I
PROCESSES INVOLVED IN OMITTING A NECESSARY STEP [65]
prevention of which must be addressed through motiva-
tional and organizational remedies vis-a`-vis improving the
quality and delivery of information within an organization
and project.
3) Slips and lapses of attention—an error that occurs as a re-
sult of forgetfulness, habit, or similar psychological issues.
Here the error typically occurs at the level of execution and
generally involves routine tasks in familiar surroundings.
Reason [62] suggests such errors are associated with some
form of attention capture, either distraction from the im-
mediate surroundings or a preoccupation with something.
Omission errors arise when the mental process of action con-
trol is subjected to strain or distraction [65]. Action control
involves at least four stages, planning, intention storage, ex-
ecution, and monitoring, and a problem in any one of these
processes may lead to an omission occurrence (Table I).
Determining the exact cognitive processes that are involved
in omitting a crucial task is an arduous process, as even the
error maker finds it difficult to identify the cause of a specific
failure. Reason [65] suggests that to reduce the incidence of
omission errors in a process, there needs to be a shift away from
examining the underlying mental processes involved to those
characteristics most likely to afford them. Several authors have
identified a number of task properties that are likely to increase
the probability that a particular task in a process will be omitted,
as depicted by the following examples.
1) The greater the informational loading of a particular task,
i.e., items within a step are more likely to be omitted
when the demands imposed upon short-term memory are
higher [59].
2) Procedural steps that are functionally isolated, i.e., ones
that are not obviously cued by preceding actions nor follow
in a direct linear succession from are more likely to be left
out [65].
3) Recursive or repeated procedural steps are particularly
prone to omission. In the case where two similar steps are
required to achieve a particular goal, it is the second of
these two steps that is most likely to be neglected [39].
4) Steps in which the item to be acted is concealed is liable
to omission [65].
5) Steps located near the end of a task sequence are likely
to be omitted. Such premature exits are due, in part, to
the actor’s preoccupation with the next task, particularly,
when the current activity involves largely routine tasks
[63].
6) Tasks that involve planned departures from standard op-
erating procedures or from habitual action sequences are
liable to strong intrusions in which the currently intended
actions are supplanted by a more frequently used routine
in that context, and thus, omitted [65].
A number of the aforesaid omissions may occur simultane-
ously and be combined into a single task. When this happens,
the effects are additive and the result is a recurrent error trap
for those involved [63].
A. Error Cycle
Errors are often not immediately identifiable and only tran-
spire after a period of incubation in the system [18], [25]. Af-
ter sometime these errors are detected and rework is identi-
fied which increases the amount of work to be undertaken by
staff [25], [67], [68]. The degree of rework required will be
dependent on how long the error has remained undetected. For
instance, a dimensional error or spatial conflict contained within
design documentation may not arise until the project is being
physically constructed on-site. If the error necessitates a major
change to be undertaken then all the perceived progress prior
to the error occurring may be considered wasted. Addressing
the error may generate more work for individuals and the pos-
sibility of more errors being generated. Poor rates of progress
occur mainly when staff involved in the documentation process
either leave the design organization (staff turnover) or become
unavailable (due to illness or recreational leave) and replace-
ment staff are needed to complete the documentation process.
Discontinuity of design staff can have a significant impact on
design process performance. This is because all project knowl-
edge and information accrued by each staff member cannot be
readily passed directly from one individual to the next, even if
a hand-over “transient” period (and/or debriefing) occurs. Even
staff recruited from the same office cannot acquire sufficiently
detailed project knowledge immediately after they commence
work on the project. In practice, documentation activities are
executed at varying levels (depending upon the skill and experi-
ence of the individual designer) and as a result this is also likely
to impact on documentation quality.
When a project begins to be delayed or there is a potential
for delay, then management invariably focus on the resource
and productivity to deliver the project successfully. Cooper [25]
suggests that the quality and the error discovery rate are the most
important factors that should be considered. Simply throwing
more resources at the project does not solve the fundamental
problems; a more effective approach should be to reduce the
number of errors or at least the time taken over their detection.
The undertaking of a design audit, verification and review are
practices that can be adopted to minimize the occurrence of
errors (particularly those of dimensional nature).
Errors occur because of a complex array of interactions,
and therefore, attempting to isolate a singular causal variable
is deemed to be an unfitting strategy to undertake [52]. Once an
understanding of the archetypal nature and underlying dynamics
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TABLE II
SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS BY POSITION AND INDUSTRY SECTOR
of errors is acquired, then error reduction (measures designed
to limit the occurrence of errors) and error containment (mea-
sures designed to enhance the detection and recovery of errors,
as well as minimize their adverse consequences) strategies can
be implemented in projects [53].
IV. RESEARCH APPROACH
To determine the latent conditions that contribute to omission
errors, an exploratory research approach was adopted. This was
because limited research pertaining to the causal ascription of
omission errors has been undertaken within the domain of con-
struction and resource engineering projects. Causal modeling,
an inherent feature of system dynamics, was used to construct
a systemic causal model of omission errors. A similar approach
has been used to examine claims [24], the rework cycle [25],
the causes of delays and disruption [1], the impact of client
behavior on project performance [68], the effects of scope on
project performance [26], the cost and time performance of de-
sign and build projects [27], and the causes of design-induced
rework [53]. Causal modeling can be used to provide managers
with the necessary insights about the interdependencies and be-
havior between key variables that can contribute to omissions so
that learning and process improvements can be made to future
projects [1], [30].
A. Data Collection
Fifty-nine in-depth interviews were conducted over a six-
month period with a variety of personnel such as operations
managers, project managers, engineering managers, and ar-
chitects from the construction and resource engineering sector
(Table II). Interviews were used as the mechanism to determine
the causal nature of omission errors. Interviews were chosen as
the primary data collection mechanism because they are an ef-
fective tool for learning about matters that cannot be observed.
According to Taylor and Bogdan [73, p. 79], no other method
“can provide the detailed understanding that comes from di-
rectly observing people and listening to what they have to say
at the scene.”
Construction and resource engineering firms from Mel-
bourne, Perth, and Sydney were selectively sampled and invited
to participate in the research so as to reduce the likelihood of
duplicating experiences from the same project. Firms in the Top
20 for construction and resource engineering by turnover as per
the Dun and Bradstreet listing were identified and those where
the research team had a direct contact point were invited to
participate in the research. The interviews were conducted at
the offices of interviewees. Interviews were tape recorded and
transcribed verbatim to allow for the nuances in the interview to
be apparent in the text. The interviewees’ details were coded to
allow for anonymity, although all interviewees were aware that
it might be possible to identify them from the content of the text.
The format of the interviews was kept as consistent as possible
following the themes associated with rework identified from the
literature. Interviews were kept open using phrases such as “tell
me about it” or “can you give me an example.” The open nature
of the questions allowed for avenues of interest to be pursued as
they arose without introducing bias in the response. Notes were
taken during the interview to support the tapes to maintain va-
lidity. Each of the interviews varied in length from 45 min to 2 h.
Interviews were open to stimulate conversation and breakdown
any barriers that may have existed between the interviewer and
interviewee.
B. Data Analysis
The text derived from the interviews was analyzed using QSR
N5 (which is a version of NUD∗IST and combines the efficient
management of nonnumerical unstructured data with powerful
processes of indexing and theorizing) and enabled the devel-
opment of themes to be identified. One advantage of such a
software is that it enables additional data sources and journal
notes to be incorporated into the analysis. The development
and reassessment of themes as analysis progresses accords with
the calls for avoiding confining data to predetermined sets of
categories [72]. Kvale [50] suggests that ad hoc methods for
generating meaning enable the researcher access to “a variety
of common-sense approaches to interview text using an inter-
play of techniques such as noting patterns, seeing plausibility,
making comparisons, etc.” (p. 204)
Using NUD∗IST enabled the researchers to develop an or-
ganic approach to coding as it enabled triggers or categories of
interest in the text to be coded and used to keep track of emerg-
ing and developing ideas [50]. These codings can be modified,
integrated or migrated as the analysis progresses and the genera-
tion of reports, using Boolean search, facilitates the recognition
of conflicts and contradictions. This process enabled the devel-
opment of a causal model that was augmented by taxonomies
developed by Busby and Hughes [18] to identify pathogens that
emerged. Reason’s [65] classification of “failure types” (i.e.,
mistake, violation, lapse, slip) was used to determine the reason
for the occurrence of an omission error (Table I).
V. ANATOMY OF OMISSION ERRORS
The interviews revealed insights about participants and their
experiences associated with omission errors in projects. Table II
presents a summary of interviewees sampled by industry sec-
tor. From the interviews, a total of 85 omission error cases
were derived from the interviewees’ comments. For each of the
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TABLE III
COMMON PATHOGENS AND OMISSION ERRORS IDENTIFIED
omission errors identified, the pathogen category [18] and fail-
ure type [65] were identified.
A. Error Categorization
Table III presents a categorization of pathogens, examples of
omission errors, and the respective failure type. It can be seen
that 53 (62%) of errors were due to practice, 11 (13%) task, 5
(6%) circumstance, 11 (13%) convention, and 5 (6%) tool.
Table IV presents an example of a practice-based pathogen
that was undertaken using a peer-review of design documen-
tation for internal purposes (so as to reduce risk and not to
examine how the mechanical engineering design married with
the project’s structural elements). This practice not only results
in the review process being ineffective but is likely to lead de-
signers into a false sense of security and perhaps aberrant to
self-checking [18].
In Fig. 1, the causal path of a practice-based pathogen is de-
picted. Here, it can be seen that an array of practices contribute
to the occurrence of an omission error. The practice of designing
work based on tentative information, departing from established
procedures, and underestimating the time for engineering design
are common conditions with which design firms are confronted.
The effects of adopting such practices can lead to higher de-
mands being placed on project personnel (e.g., stress and anxi-
ety), conflict, and naturally, increased project time and cost.
In terms of tasks, the causes of omissions are related to de-
signers and project personnel being placed under increasing
pressure to complete their tasks within a specified time frame.
Unrealistic demands and constraints were deemed to have been
imposed on project personnel, which often resulted in tasks be-
ing “unwittingly” overlooked or omitted from a predetermined
sequence. For example, in Table IV, project personnel were con-
fused about whose role it was to order materials. This situation
arose because the engineering manager had not confirmed with
the procurement personnel the required specification for some
offshore equipment that was required. Without the confirma-
tion, no order could be placed. Yet, the procurement personnel
simply forgot to follow up with the engineering manager and
without checking assumed that an order had been placed.
Many of the underlying conditions that contribute to an omis-
sion are interdependent, and in many instances, isolating a spe-
cific pathogen proved difficult, particularly, in terms of circum-
stance and convention (Table IV). The issue of design fees was
identified by interviewees in the construction sector as a factor
contributing to an omission and design-related rework. Lower
design fees juxtaposed with a “stretched” design and docu-
mentation schedule invariably resulted in tasks such as design
reviews, checks, and verification being omitted. Moreover, to
maximize fees and save design time, the existing design details
and specification are reused, which may result in having a design
that is inappropriate for its intended purpose.
Table III identifies an example of an omission error and how
it was classified in terms of failure type. Of the 85 omission
cases identified, violations accounted for 51 (60%) slips 14
(16%), lapses 13 (15%), and mistakes 7 (8%). Many of the
violations identified were simply committed with the intention
of increasing operational efficiency. Firms cannot and should not
tolerate disregard for established procedures. The consequences
of following such a course of action could be disastrous, not only
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TABLE IV
EXAMPLES OF INTERVIEWEE COMMENTS AND OMISSION ERRORS
in terms of increased project costs and time but areas of safety
and design integrity. There are several compelling reasons for
this. One is, of course, that standardization of operations cannot
be achieved with idiosyncratic adherence to procedures.
B. Causal Model of Omission Errors
A detailed analysis of the interview data enabled the re-
searchers to determine the archetypal nature and underlying
dynamics of errors, and thus, develop a systemic causal model
(Fig. 2). Fig. 2 identifies the common pathogens and circum-
stances that can promote an active failure to arise. Client re-
quirements and the fees and margins of designers, consultants,
and contractors were issues that influenced the planning and
resource allocation and the subsequent workload of individuals.
More often than not in projects, individuals and teams are given
excessive workloads that require them to work longer hours in
order to meet schedule. Consequently, individuals are subjected
to increased levels of workplace stress and subjected to informa-
tion overload that can affect short-term memory of individuals
(Table IV). This can result in a task deviation occurring through
a lapse or slip.
Procedures such as checking are simply overlooked or not
given the due attention that is required when pressure to “get
the job done” is exerted. Views from respondents revealed that it
is often taken for granted that if there are “omissions” and they
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Fig. 1. Causal path: Pathogen and omission error.
cannot be readily detected, then they will be picked up later
in the project. The longer an error goes undetected, the likeli-
hood of significant rework occurring increases that can impact
cost and schedule. It was suggested by an engineering man-
ager that a parochial attitude of “she’ll be right” was prevalent
in many projects, and thus, contributed to the establishment of
complacency. This was also identified as occurring in several in-
stances by project managers on-site in construction and resource
projects. Another interviewee stated that some engineers on-site
often do not adhere to company quality procedures/standards
and fail to complete the required documentation. Only when
noncompliance is issued or an audit is undertaken that they be-
gin to do what they are supposed to do. Then, after a period,
the engineers on-site tend to go back to their original modus
operandi. It was suggested by the project manager that some
form of penalty could be issued for continually adhering to
noncomplaint practices or some form of educational program
explaining why procedural compliance was necessary should be
undertaken.
When projects were subjected to fast-tracking (overlapping
of design and construction activities), then it was found that the
reuse of design details and specifications by architects and en-
gineers were approaches used to minimize their workload and
the production of a tentative design. This can lead to incom-
plete information with regard to design. The effects of having
tentative design information are compounded further when or-
ganizations use differing technology and software applications
that are partly incompatible (interoperability). Simple, prag-
matic considerations such as checking for design inconsisten-
cies are overlooked due to an “unhealthy” overreliance on the
software applications output.
Ambiguous communication, such as not providing clear di-
rection and information on what, when, and how a task is to be
completed, can result in tasks being omitted. This was clearly
the case in the example presented in Table IV, when there was a
misunderstanding about the late placement of purchase orders.
Interruptions to tasks being undertaken due to rework, design
changes, or sequencing of tasks may result in an individual for-
getting what they were supposed to do and skip particular steps
because they have been delayed.
VI. ERROR MANAGEMENT
Identification of the underlying causes of omission errors can
assist with the development of error management strategies.
Traditional quality control methods identify variation as neme-
sis in a process. The control of variation by itself can never
achieve the significant low nonconformance levels that are ex-
pected by organizations and those required in projects. Mistakes
are the most common cause of error in health care and industrial
environments [40]. Excessive product and process complexity
have been reported as being the underlying contributors to er-
rors. Projects in the resource and construction engineering are
typically complex and the pressures associated with satisfying
clients and stakeholders are inexorable for those organizations
given the responsibility for the delivery of a project. Invariably,
pressures associated with the timely delivery of projects (e.g.,
processing plants, offshore platforms, roads, hospitals, schools,
etc.) are of central concern to industry clients. Key drivers fa-
cilitating the need for the timely delivery of projects are the
increasing costs of capital, increased shareholder expectations
for a return on investment, the need to be responsive to market
needs, environmental concerns, and the requirement for phys-
ical infrastructure to meet the growing needs of an increasing
population.
The pressures associated with “stretched” design and con-
struction schedules and the current skills shortage in Australia
have often contributed to design-related documentation not be-
ing completed before the commencement of construction [11].
Increased job demands and information overload can lead to
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Fig. 2. Systemic causal model of pathogens and omission errors.
the occurrence of mistakes, yet the evidence presented clearly
reveals that procedural violations are the primary contributors to
omission errors, especially with design consultants. It would ap-
pear that individuals are purposefully not taking the appropriate
time to check for errors.
Design consultants (such as architects and engineers) are ex-
pected to use reasonable and ordinary care in the practice of their
profession and their responsibilities are, in part, defined by so-
cial ascription [33]. From a legal perspective, this is well known
among the professions but clients are not always aware or made
aware of this [34]. Architects and engineers cannot guarantee the
results of their service. Their liability for errors and omissions,
however, can be “determined by whether they have performed
their services with the standard of care consistent with other pro-
fessional designers within their community” [34]. Once clients
are aware of their designer’s obligation they often find it difficult
to comprehend what is meant by standard of care [19]. Usually,
this is left up to a court of law or a panel of experts once a
breach of the standard of care is identified, but this can be a long
and tedious process for clients with no guarantee of a successful
outcome (e.g., [19]). Even when a standard of care is agreed
upon precontract, any financial recovery may hinge on whether
the mistake was an error (mistakes made by the designer) or
omission (omitted from the contract).
A. Reducing Omissions: Violations, Slips, Mistakes, and Lapses
The human error problem can be viewed at two levels: the
person approach and the system approach [64]. The person
approach focuses on the errors of individuals, blaming them
for forgetfulness, inattention, carelessness, poor motivation, and
negligence. The system approach concentrates on the conditions
under which individuals work and tries to build defences to avert
errors or mitigate their effects.
The person approach focuses on the acts such as procedu-
ral violations that cause the error. Under the auspices of this
approach, individuals are targeted and blamed for an error oc-
currence as it is deemed to be more “emotionally satisfying than
targeting institutions” [64]. Essentially, individuals are viewed
as having a choice between adopting error free or erroneous-
based behaviors. If an error occurs, then it is obvious that an
individual is responsible and so effort is spent trying to uncouple
a person’s acts from organizational liability.
The types of errors that continually arise in projects tend
to be similar in nature, and as a result, “recurrent error traps”
materialize. For example, it has been demonstrated that failure
to undertake procedural tasks during the design process [3],
[4], [16], and continual design reuse [14] are leitmotiv’s that
emerge as practices contributing to omission errors. The work
practices implemented by organizations can provoke similar
errors, regardless of the skills and experiences of the people
involved in a project.
The pathogens that are likely to provoke omissions were
identified in Table IV. An organization’s immediate attention
should focus on the task and the identification of appropriate
reminders/checks so that lapses, slips, mistakes, or even viola-
tions do not occur, especially during the preparation of contract
documentation. Task analysis involves decomposing an activity
or procedure into a meaningful number of discrete steps. This is
not a particularly difficult process, but can be time consuming
for organizations, though those that have a quality assurance sys-
tem in place would invariably have a stepwise process protocol
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documented and in place. It is, therefore, necessary to be se-
lective in choosing the procedures for omission management.
The most obvious basis for selection is the criticality of the
task; would the omission of a particular task adversely influ-
ence project performance or design integrity? Should the con-
sequences of such omissions be severe, then this would warrant
the use of suitable reminders to undertake the task at hand.
Omission-based strategies that can be used include [65]: notes
and post-its, dairies, lists, getting others to act as reminders,
mental checking, and mental rehearsal. While such strategies
can be effective for addressing slips and lapses, and possibly
even mistakes, they are ineffectual for preventing individuals
from purposefully taking short cuts or missing out a process
altogether.
Purely focusing on blaming an individual or attacking their
ability to perform tasks may have detrimental consequences to
learning and error reduction. Causal ascription after an error oc-
currence is deemed necessary to obtain knowledge about events
for the purpose of undertaking subsequent action [46]. Assigned
causes can lead to considerable differences in behavior [76]. It
has been shown that error causes such as lack of effort are less
desirable than “lack of ability,” as they lead to constructive rather
than destructive behavior [31]. Behavior after error occurrence
is influenced by the presentation of positive error heuristics, for
example, “I made an error; I can learn from this!” [36]. Such
positive error heuristics are presented to facilitate emotional
coping after error occurrence, thereby aiding people to consider
that errors can also be interpreted as informative feedback [42].
It has been shown that error management training leads to more
functional task behavior, such as more requests for assistance,
less frustration, and better performance [58]. Behavior modifi-
cation can occur at an individual level regarding omission errors
due to mistakes, lapses, and slips. When an individual is deemed
to be recalcitrant (e.g., due to pressures beyond their control)
and “violations” arise, then behavior modification should be
perfunctory through systemic intervention.
Postproject or retrospective reviews, undertaken at an organi-
zational or project level, are fundamental to error management
and learning, as individuals may not automatically learn from
their own experience [14]. To learn, individuals need to test new
experiences against existing knowledge, and then, consciously
reflect upon what has transpired [14]. The knowledge that is
acquired during the review is usually dispersed among several
people and it is this accumulation of “collective knowledge” that
can be used as an enabler to systemic intervention by changing
the conditions under which the individual performs their tasks
so that omissions are eschewed in future projects.
An organization’s culture influences the behavioral practices
adopted by individuals. Effective risk management in a project is
dependent upon a culture of reporting being in place [20]. Such
a culture is integral to those organizations that have openly em-
braced total quality management (TQM) or significant aspects
thereof. Without a detailed analysis of errors that have occurred
using techniques such as causal loop diagramming [53], Pareto
analysis [44], and fault tree analysis [22], there is no way of
determining the “recurrent error traps” and risks that may re-
side within an organization and the project system. When a
reporting culture is embedded within an organization, then it
is important that there be a collective understanding of where
the line should be drawn between blameless and blameworthy
actions [54]. The development of an organization and project
culture based on “objectivity and learning” is needed in this
case. Many construction organizations, for example, have not
actively embraced learning and quality practices. Such practices
are critical components of an effective continuous improvement
program, which invariably aims to negate errors.
VII. CONCLUSION
Omission errors are a problematic issue in construction and
resource engineering projects. The competitive environment
within which firms operate often results in shortcuts and pro-
cedural tasks being neglected in order to achieve the demands
being imposed on them. Organizations and individuals tend to
repeat such practices because they become complacent as there
appear to be no direct consequences for their actions. Even when
errors do arise, there appears to be no transfer of learning from
previous experiences. This is because organizations operating
in a project environment are subject to new demands and con-
straints by different client organizations. The causal model that
has been presented can be used to provide project managers
with a better understanding of the omission affording features
inherent to projects, and therefore, aid them in identifying and
implementing error containment and reduction strategies. The
caveat to this is that no one strategy is a panacea for reducing
omissions, but focusing on the reduction of violations and adher-
ing to procedures and protocols is the first step that is required
in this instance.
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